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Le  G IRSEF dans  l 'Un i ve rs i t é  Ca tho l i que  de  Louva in  
 
 
L'éducation et la formation constituent des enjeux fondamentaux pour la société contempo-
raine. Interpellée par ces enjeux au regard des ses missions de recherche et de service à la 
société, l'Université a créé le GIRSEF : un lieu clairement identifiable dédié au développe-
ment de la recherche sur les dynamiques de transformation et de restructuration des systè-
mes d'éducation et de formation. Le GIRSEF a pour vocation de penser rigoureusement et 
globalement ces transformations en matière éducative ainsi que leurs implications sociales, 
culturelles et politiques, dans une perspective pluridisciplinaire (économie, sociologie, psy-
chopédagogie,...). Les recherches qui s'y déroulent se font en lien étroit avec les activités de 
recherche des départements des différentes disciplines concernées. 
 
La série des Cahiers de recherche du GIRSEF a pour objectif de diffuser les résultats des 
travaux menés au sein du GIRSEF auprès d'un public de chercheurs en sciences de l'éduca-
tion et de la formation ainsi qu'auprès des acteurs et décideurs de ces deux mondes .  
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To be "just", a society should treat every child fairly, 
i.e. with equal concern with regard to his potential 
education achievements. A person's educational 
achievements is indeed essential for enhancing her 
capacity for self-development: ideally, they all should 
have the same opportunities for achieving a level of 
formal education that would allow them to further 
study and compete for the jobs that they are fit for. 
This requires that the allocation of public educational 
resources among children should satisfy some princi-
ples of justice. Alongside objectives in terms of 
equality of "extended resources", recent theories of 
justice have emphasised the importance of taking 
into account personal responsibility in the design of 
equal opportunity policies. Allocation rules of educa-
tional expenditures should compensate for difference 
in non-controllable (by the child) determinants of 
school achievements, but also let freely determined 
effort levels to be adequately rewarded.  
 
Some allocation rules inspired by those requirements 
are discussed and the underlying reasoning for con-
sidering them are questioned along four different di-
mensions : 1. the child's effort and its determinants 2. 
the child's "school achievement production function": 
i.e. substitutability or complementarity between the 
determinants of school achievements, 3. the impor-
tance of externalities within the class room (peer ef-
fects) 4. the structure of the secondary school curric-
ula. It is argued that all those dimensions are justifying 
the importance given to equal opportunity considera-
tions but are also essential in identifying what should 
be the basic features of an equal opportunity strategy. 
In particular, they suggest that the focus on responsi-
bility as one essential dimension in the design of such 
a strategy might be misplaced. But it also points out 
that an equal opportunity strategy consisting of com-
pensating for inequality in endowments among chil-
dren should also carefully incorporate various incen-
tives mechanisms that will both enhance the effective-
ness of the equality of opportunity strategy while con-
tributing at the same time to the maximisation of the 
total human capital acquired by the children. 
 
Section 1 discusses what is the "equal opportunity" 
approach to schooling, its raison d'être. Section 2 re-
views and critically discuss the basic "equal opportu-
nity" model and its implications. Sections 3 and 4 pre-
sent modifications and extensions of this framework 
and section 5 concludes with some policy recommen-
dations. 
Abstract 
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It has long been recognised that, there are wide dis-
parities among children in their probabilities of 
achieving a certain level of formal education, at the 
primary level as well as the secondary level of 
schooling1. Despite effort made to reduce those dis-
parities (positive discrimination), those disparities 
seem to persist2. They are related to a multitude of 
factors. Differences in parents behaviour towards 
schooling (parents' ambitions for their children edu-
cation, their ability and commitment to help and sup-
port them in the studying process, but also parents-
teachers-school relations), in family income and 
wealth (even if education is "free") and in other 
socio-economically related cultural factors (cultural 
and scientific "climate" or environment), have been 
made responsible for quite a long time for the exis-
tence of those inequalities3. Useless to say, correla-
tion among those factors might also be significant. 
 
Recent work has also been referring to a more contro-
versial factor, because of its many possible interpre-
tations, the so-called child's "innate ability" or 
"talents" for education. There has been considerable 
discussion as to what importance could be given to 
such "innate ability" and what it really consists in, the 
extreme position denying its existence altogether and 
making all our "initial" differences in capacity for 
learning dependent upon contextual factors, espe-
cially socio-economic background. However, nobody 
can at least deny the existence of natural, i.e. men-
tal, handicaps (negative talents !). Nevertheless it 
should not be too much of a concern for us at this 
stage. It will be later on. Suffice to say that we now 
recognise the existence of a range of exogenous fac-
tors (factors beyond the control of the child himself) 
that affect a child's capacity to learn and to obtain a 
certain level of formal educational achievement. 
 
A second class of exogenous factors that might affect 
school achievements is the amount of resources re-
ceived by the child for accomplishing his study re-
quirements. These resources are those provided by 
the budget that either the private or the public educa-
tional institutions have at their disposable and the way 
this budget is actually spent. They include the number 
of teachers, their salary, expenditures on learning 
tools, student-teacher ratio, other school expenditures, 
school size. Although there is widespread disagree-
ment as to the effects on those different school expen-
ditures on school achievements, it is nevertheless 
usually assumed that this a major, if not the essential 
instrument for educational policy both for efficiency 
and equity objectives4. With regard to the latter, the 
"positive discrimination" in favour of schools "with 
problems", i.e. the definition of "priority educational 
zones", which will receive additional resources for 
helping overcome the disadvantages of their specific 
scholarly population, is a current example of that line 
of thinking. 
 
Finally, one might consider that achievements (be at 
school or at work...) are also determined by our own 
decisions about "effort". This is standard in the labour 
economics literature. To what extent, as far as school 
pupils are concerned, is "effort" conceptually meaning-
ful and effectively independent of the other factors 
mentioned above is in my view an open question ! The 
standard economist's view on this would be that a 
child, at least after a certain age, is making choices 
1. Equal opportunity and the ethics of responsibility in education 
1 It has been estimated that, for the Belgian French-speaking 
community, less than a third of a given cohort of children enter-
ing in the first grade will have access to higher education. Even 
more dramatic, 37% of that same cohort will not even obtain 
their secondary school certificate. 
2 In Europe, we are just celebrating more or less the twentieth 
anniversary of the "ZEP's" (Priority Education Zone) that have 
been the landmark of the positive discrimination approach to 
equal opportunity. 
3 There is a very extensive literature on school achievements 
"production function": for a general introduction to the subject, 
see Belfield (2000), pp.75-78. 
4 The usual reference is Hanusheck (1986). Most recent references 
are Figlio (1999), Dewey & al. (2000). The latter includes an ex-
tensive updated bibliography. 
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between work (study) and all the other activities un-
related to schooling (including yawning during class 
time !) These choices have definite impacts on child's 
behaviour with respect to schooling even if the child 
is enrolled in a compulsory educational program. The 
chosen combination by each person (child) between 
studying and the other activities is supposed to re-
flect her preferences given relative prices and time 
and income constraints. In other words, supposedly 
there are inherently highly motivated, strongly work-
ing kids who like to study and there are bored, lazy 
ones who don't. Given their respective preferences, 
they are making observable choices because they 
manifest themselves, so the argument goes, under 
the form of "deviant" behaviour: class disruptions, 
repeated evaluation failures, drop-outs, and the like 
for the lazy ones on one hand or high scores test, 
regularity, punctuality for the highly motivated ones 
on the other. A moment of reflection suggests that it 
might not be that simple or self-evident. Class and 
study behaviour might not be exclusively, or even 
predominantly if at all determined by "preferences", 
by "pure free will" or "ambition". The relevance of 
those concepts in the context of schooling behaviour 
will be discussed more extensively in section 3. How-
ever, let us suppose at this stage, to be consistent 
with the ethics of responsibility framework that we 
are going to analyse, that effort, or ambition, or "pure 
will", might be unambiguously defined and is an ef-
fective determinant of a child's schooling behaviour. 
A standard school achievement production function 
would then look like the following. 
i.e. the handicaps or talents of that child i, that affect 
child's behaviour in the schooling process aside from 
school resources rit already taken into account5. It 
must be emphasised that f  is the “universal transfor-
mation function” that converts all the {e, r, h} combina-
tions into a given level of I and is thus not person-
specific6. Again, we will not so far say very much 
about the precise functional form of (1) although as we 
will see later on, it is of key importance for the fairness 
issue. Let us just say, as indicated above, that it is 
reasonable to say that all partial derivatives will be 
greater or equal to zero and that the absence of any 
school resources makes school achievements impos-
sible. The issue of the more precise functional form of 
(1) will be taken up later. 
 
Using such very simple analytical framework, we 
might now ask ourselves what would be a "fair" educa-
tional system? There are no simple answers to this 
question. 
 
First, what opportunities do we want to equalise ? Ac-
cess to schools? Access to degrees ? Access to 
jobs ? Access to “income prospects”? The extent of 
justice within society is a matter for everyone's con-
science and socio-political views and we might have 
diverging opinions about this. The collective matter 
can only be settled by a democratic process7. The fol-
lowing discussion will assume that consensus could at 
least be achieved on the following: the minimally ap-
propriate objective of an equal opportunity policy 
would be to give to every person the same chances to 
get the job she will feel appropriate to her given her 
own personal characteristics (including the formal 
education she has received) when entering the labour 
market. This requires at least that each child, what-
ever her talents, handicaps and background, should 
have the same opportunity of pursuing her study to 
),,( itititit hrefI =                (1) 
with 0,0,0 ≥∂
∂≥∂
∂≥∂
∂
ititit h
f
r
f
e
f  
and 0),0,( =itit hef  
where Iit is the effective school achievement by child 
I or his realised investment at the end of period t , eit 
is “pure effort”, rit, the public resources allocated to 
child i (student-teacher ratio, teacher salary, expendi-
tures per student on pedagogical equipment, and the 
like). Last, hit might be a vector variable or an index 
variable lumping together all the exogenous factors, 
5 The metric used for measuring those variables are of course an 
entire issue in itself and will not be discussed here. For a general 
discussion of this type of function, see Belfield (2000) 
6 This does not amount to assuming that all children have the same 
learning efficiency but it makes all differences in efficiency de-
pendant upon the variables in the argument of the f function. 
7 With all the difficulties that we know are related to democratic 
decision-making but are beyond the scope of our present discus-
sion. 
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get the degree most appropriate to her. As a conse-
quence and for all practical purposes, all children 
should be given equal opportunities to successfully 
complete the entire general secondary level educa-
tion8. In an increasingly "knowledge based econ-
omy", such a level of formal education is becoming a 
basic necessity for any child to subsequently either 
study or work in a way that hopefully will allow for 
some degree of self-fulfilment. 
 
Second, some basic distinctions might be useful. 
Had we not defined the f function with the variable e 
in its argument, equality of opportunity would be then 
be equivalent to equality of outcomes, each one of 
them requiring equal "extended resources", i.e. an 
identical combination of {r, h}. However, the ethics of 
responsibility recognises that free persons are mak-
ing voluntary choices in conducting their life as im-
plied by the f (eit, rit, hit) formulation. Second, some 
basic distinctions might be useful. Had we not de-
fined the f function with the variable e in its argu-
ment, equality of opportunity would be then be 
equivalent to equality of outcomes, each one of them 
requiring equal "extended resources", i.e. an identi-
cal combination of {r, h}. However, the ethics of re-
sponsibility recognises that free persons are making 
voluntary choices in conducting their life as implied 
by the  formulation. Free persons should then as-
sume the responsibility for the consequences of 
those choices, in terms either of rewards or penal-
ties. Equality of outcomes (everyone should obtain a 
given degree) becomes questionable since such a 
policy would not take into account differences in pref-
erences among persons. By not doing so, such a 
policy will unfairly treat those who are putting a very 
strong effort to achieve such outcome (hard working 
children) relatively to those who do not. The exis-
tence of significant differences in preferences and 
their consequences for the outcomes implies that 
equality of outcomes can no longer coincide with 
equality of opportunities. The latter then becomes the 
only relevant principle of fairness if one believes in the 
importance of personal responsibility in the determina-
tion of outcomes9. But on the other hand that same 
"ethics of responsibility" recognises that those same 
persons should be compensated for those factors, i.e. 
handicaps (or talents?) over which they do not have 
any control, for which they cannot be held accountable 
but will affect the outcome of their activity10. Failure to 
do so would be unfair to those who, despite putting 
the same effort as some others, will not achieve the 
same outcomes because, let us say, a natural or so-
cial handicap (i.e. hard working kids but parents do 
not bother...). 
 
If we believe that (1) is an adequate representation of 
a child’s school achievement production function, what 
would be, among all the rit’s, a just allocation of Rt, the 
total amount of resources that public authorities are 
making available for educational purposes? What will 
be a “fair” division of Rt?11 The approach to the fair di-
vision issue of the “ethics of responsibility” is that soci-
ety should not interfere with the relation between a 
person's choices and the "spontaneous" conse-
quences for her of those same choices. These two re-
quirements are translated into two principles, each 
one of them implying a specific allocation rule for Rt.12 
We now turn to the examination of these two princi-
ples and their implications in the context of education. 
8 More on this and on the implication of equal opportunity in 
terms of the structure of the program in section 4. 
9 In the context of fairness of competition, Arnsperger and DeVillé 
argue that responsibility might no longer be relevant whenever 
winner-take-all situations are prevalent. 
10 See for example Van Parijs (1998) for replacing this approach 
within a general typology of theories of justice. This framework is 
critically reviewed by Arnsperger & DeVillé (2000) in the general 
context of "fairness of competition." 
11 For convenience and to be consistent with our previous defini-
tion of , we lump together in Rt the general budget expenditures for 
education and the budget that public authorities decide to use for 
equal opportunity in education.  
12 The definition of the two principles is due to Fleurbaey (1998) 
which provides a comprehensive discussion of them, drawing on 
previous work, i.e. Fleurbaey (1995).  
Cahier de Recherche du GIRSEF - n° 17·•  March 2003 •  
Page  8 
First, the principle of compensation requires that 
every person that might suffer from a particular 
handicap should receive additional resources, in 
comparison to those who do not suffer from such 
handicap, in order to correct, at least to some extent, 
such relative disadvantage. In other words, the prin-
ciple always involves some transfer of resources 
from the non-handicapped to the handicapped or, if 
we deal with talents, from the more talented to the 
less talented  in comparison to the rule of equal re-
sources for each child. This amounts to say that in-
herited talents are collective resources and inherited 
("natural") handicaps are collective impediments that, 
although embedded in persons, do not justify for 
them either differential claims or differential losses13. 
Assuming it feasible just for the sake of the argu-
ment, perfect compensation would imply that out-
comes would only be dependent upon "voluntary" 
choices, effort, free will, whatever each person's level 
of talents or handicaps and that this relation is inde-
pendent from any personal characteristics14. In the 
field of education, this could mean that not only chil-
dren with "unfavourable" social, family background 
would receive some form of specific help, but also 
children with low "innate ability for studying" will be 
compensated for. But that in the end and assuming 
again complete compensation, a child's school 
achievements would only depend upon his voluntar-
ily supplied effort, a given amount of effort leading to 
the same achievements for all children. 
 
Second, there is the principle of natural reward. Its 
basic idea is simple: there are no reasons whatso-
ever that would justify society distorting the "natural" 
2. Compensation versus natural reward 
13 There are numerous questions related to the actual design of 
such a principle. For a survey of these questions, see Van Parijs 
(1990). 
14 I realise that this might appear ambiguous. It should not. It is 
just reminding us that f is not indexed over i. However it is obvi-
ous the functional f might be non linear, its partial derivatives 
being a function of some of the variables in the argument, in that 
sense person's specific. The importance of this point will be 
made clear later on. 
15 Even for those who hold non-paternalistic views, this is clearly 
open to discussion as a truly general principle if we accept the idea 
that our lives do not belong only to ourselves. 
16 This would imply a specific assumption about the func-
tion f. See later. 
consequences of each person's choice at least in 
some domain of life15. This implies that the allocation 
rule should be such that all persons having the same 
talents or handicaps should receive the same rit, the 
public resource. As a consequence, N persons having 
a given identical level of talents or handicaps,  
 
for 
 
and who choose to put the same effort, or pure will,  
 
 
 
into the realisation function ƒ, should be rewarded by 
the same outcome  for  
 
 
 
This illustrates the principle of “equal treatment of 
equals”. And as a corollary, for persons endowed with 
identical talents, the relation between the differences 
in outcomes and differences in effort will only depend 
on the functional ƒ, identical for all persons. But it 
does not imply in general that differences in achieve-
ments due to differences in effort will be identical 
whatever the level of talents and resources16. 
 
That these two principles are independent of each 
other can be easily understood. The principle of natu-
ral reward determines an allocation rule between per-
sons endowed with identical talents. It does not say 
anything about what should be the allocation rule be-
tween persons, or class of persons, endowed with dif-
ferent levels of talents or handicaps. This is where the 
principle of compensation comes into play. Note that 
in both cases, the allocation rule is independent of the 
hh it = toNii 1, =∀
ite =  e  fo r toNii 1, =∀   
tit II =  for toNii 1, =∀ .  
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effort levels performed by each and every person. As 
a consequence, their implementation might run 
against efficiency criteria. This is obvious for the prin-
ciple of compensation. But it is also the case for the 
principle of natural reward. It forbids for example to 
give more (less) resources to those who puts more 
(less) effort into their activities, as we often do when 
using incentives schemes of the "carrot-and-stick" 
kind (rewards and punishment). As a consequence, 
the allocation rule implied by this principle might not 
be Pareto-efficient17. Finally, as already said before, 
if responsibility does not play any role in outcome de-
termination, the principle of compensation should 
lead to equality of outcomes. And, on the contrary, 
this principle becomes irrelevant if responsibility 
(preferences) is the only determinant of outcomes. 
 
What are the implications of using these two princi-
ples for the design of an "equal opportunity" strategy 
in education? In a series of stimulating papers, Fleur-
baey and Trannoy have discussed several aspects of 
this question18. Are these two principles compatible 
to each other ? Are they satisfactory guiding princi-
ples of justice in the realm of education if one wants 
to achieve the best possible equal opportunity in 
education? To discuss these questions, let us now 
turn to the specific applications of the ethics of re-
sponsibility framework in the design of an equal op-
portunity approach in education. 
 
The precise application of the two principles already 
discussed seems straightforward. The principle of 
compensation would require that relatively more re-
sources should be allocated to children from low 
socio-economic background, suffering from cognitive 
problems for either "natural" or social reasons and 
relatively less to children with the opposite character-
istics. In its most requiring form, it can be expressed 
as :  
The principle of natural reward on the other hand 
would require that all children endowed with the same 
talents (or handicaps) should receive the same 
amount of resources. It can thus be expressed in the 
following way : 
17 Fleurbaey (1998), op. cit., p. 212 
18 What follows is essentially based upon the following two con-
tributions : Fleurbaey (1998), Trannoy (1999) 
19 Trannoy (1999), p.61 
20 Fleurbaey (1995), p.40. Kranich (1997) deals with the 
same issue under incomplete information and finds that in 
such a case equal opportunity is unfeasible 
21 In other words, the cross partial derivative with respect to 
z and e is zero. 
if ei = ej then it must be that  
,, ji∀ ),,( ititit href  = ),,( jtjtjt href  (2) 
,, ji∀  if hi = hj, then ri = rj   (3) 
Combining the two requirements leads to the following 
proposition: adopt "ability grouping" over classes or 
even schools, and allocate more resources (better 
teachers) to low ability grouping and less to high 
ones19. This seems to satisfy both requirements. How-
ever, as shown by Fleurbaey, this is not necessarily 
the case unless a separability condition is imposed on 
the function f between on one hand effort and on the 
other talents and resources20.  
)),(,(),,( itititititit hrzeghref =   (4) 
=),( itit hrz ),,( itit href   (5) 
where 
The z function can be understood as an aggregation 
device operating on resources and talents independ-
ently of any individual effort characteristics of the 
child. To understand the reason for such a condition, 
let us first recall that the separability condition actually 
makes the partial derivatives of z (index of extended 
resources) with respect to rit and hit independent of the 
level of effort21. This property guarantees that allocat-
ing more to the less endowed and vice and versa will 
have the same effect on their school achievements 
whatever their respective effort level. This is of course 
crucial if the implementation of an equal opportunity 
scheme has to respect the principle of natural re-
wards. 
 
A simple example will help to understand. Suppose a 
population of children that are differentiated by ability 
levels due to their different socio-economic back-
grounds. Assume also just for the sake of the argu-
ment that they happen to be segregated among 
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schools (or classes) in terms of effort. The hard-
working students are concentrated in one school, the 
"lazy" ones in the other. An equal opportunity policy 
allocates more resources to the low ability children in 
both schools. If the achievement function f is non-
separable, the elasticity of potential school achieve-
ment with respect to resources is also a function of 
the effort level. It follows from these premises that 
the same equal opportunity policy will have quite dif-
ferent effects in each of the schools. If this elasticity 
is a decreasing function of effort, the equal opportu-
nity policy will give better school achievements to 
hard-working children compared to low-working 
ones, both of unfavourable socio-economic back-
ground. But the difference between the two groups 
will exceed what would justify the "pure effort" differ-
ential. If the elasticity happens to be an increasing 
function of effort, the situation is even more worri-
some for those unwilling to give up on the principle of 
natural rewards since it could happen that low-effort 
children will have better school achievements than 
hard-working ones22. In both instances, the principle 
of natural reward is violated. 
 
Is the ƒ function separable or not is a question whose 
answer is often presented as an empirical matter. I 
am not sure it is a purely empirical one, as we will 
see later. But the advocates of the ethics of responsi-
bility framework, recognising the empirical doubtful-
ness of the separability assumption, have explored 
basically two ways out. The first is to appropriately 
weaken the compensation principle in order to make 
it compatible with the principle of natural rewards un-
der general conditions, i.e. without separability 
(Fleurbaey, 1995). The second explores the specifics 
of the structure of the educational process (Trannoy, 
1999). 
 
Instead of strictly equalising the opportunities among 
children, which amounts to making their relative 
school achievements depending exclusively on their 
relative effort, one could imagine weaker versions of 
the compensation principle that would simply require 
partial compensation: more resources for the less en-
dowed and a guarantee of better school achievements 
for the higher-working. However, the same separabil-
ity condition is required even for these weaker ver-
sions. The only way to get rid of the separability re-
quirement is to abandon one or the other principle. 
 
The second way is to make use of the fact that school-
ing is a sequential process. It is year after year that a 
child is accumulating knowledge. At the beginning of 
each year, her past accumulated knowledge becomes 
an exogenous factor along with the other endow-
ments. Formally, this has long been recognised by in-
troducing lags in the f  function, where Ait-1 is the cu-
mulative of all previous Iit, from t=1 to t-123.  
22 In commenting his results, Fleurbaey (1995, p.41) is 
erroneously comparing children with different socio-
economic background, which is not the issue here since 
they are all assumed to perform the same effort. 
23 Belfield (2000), op.cit. 
24 Trannoy (1999), .op.cit. 
),,,( 1−= ititititit AhrefI     (6) 
where ∑
=
=
t
t
itit IA
1
 
As such, this does not change anything with the prob-
lem at hand. It even appears to make it even more 
complicated since it makes equal opportunity an every 
year requirement starting from the first year. There is 
indeed conspicuous evidence that accumulated 
knowledge Ait-1  is a crucial component for further 
school achievements. However, Trannoy's suggestion 
is that it actually makes the problem of justice simpler 
if we recognise that children cannot exercise full re-
sponsibility up to a certain age, say t*. In other words, 
this is the common sense idea that to be responsible, 
i.e. to consciously make choices about the effort you 
want to put into your own education, you have to be 
mature which implies having accumulated enough ex-
periences and reflexive capacities. In other words,  
),,),,,(( 1111 −−−−= itititititititit AhrAhrefI  for 1*,1*1, >−≤≤∀ tttt    (7) 
Effort becomes entirely determined by the other ex-
ogenous factors up to t*.  
And that after a certain age, say t**, the importance of 
exogenous factors fades out, leaving only (or mainly) 
effort to determine school achievements24.  
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Nothing a-priori tells us if t* is greater, equal or 
smaller than t**. If t*  is equal to t**, Trannoy correctly 
argues that the two principles can be fulfilled in a se-
quence. Since at the end of the (1, t*) period, all op-
portunities must have been equalised, the principle 
of natural reward can be fully implemented after-
wards during the period (t**,T), whenever t**t*. The 
problem arises if t**<t*. In this case, during the sec-
ond period (t**<t<t*), we are back to the initial prob-
lem and a choice has to be made between the two 
principles. In such instance, Trannoy rightly argues 
that the principle of compensation should prevail, 
since it allows the principle of natural reward to be 
fully implemented during the last period (t*<t<T) 
when children are most likely to be "mature".  
 
What to conclude from this ? If we follow the ethics of 
responsibility approach, invest resources in the early 
years of the school curriculum to equalise as much as 
possible basic skills among children with widely differ-
ent endowments. Once this is achieved, children hav-
ing on the other hand developed their own capacity for 
making choices, but their "extended resources" having 
been supposedly equalised, the principle of natural 
rewards simply requires equal treatment for equals, i.
e. for all children the same resources.  
 
This analysis is questionable for several reasons: the 
concept of responsibility applied to child's behaviour 
requires important qualifications, the assumptions 
about child's behaviour are not satisfactory and over-
look incentive compatibility problems and the lack of 
consideration for school functioning neglects important 
aspects like peer effects, family role in the educational 
process and teacher's involvement. All those issues 
have specific ethical implications. 
),( 1−= ititit AefI  for 1**,**, >≤≤∀ tTttt    (8)
The ethics of responsibility in the context of educa-
tion assumes that effort (or pure will) is one of the 
key determinants of school achievements by children 
and that children are after a certain age responsible 
for the intensity of the effort level that they put into 
the learning process. This notion of "responsible" ef-
fort deserves some clarifying. At the basis of their 
analysis is the idea that effort is the result of a con-
scious deliberate "choice". And choices are the ex-
pression of a person's preferences and thus ulti-
mately of her freedom in conducting her life. 
 
But between what alternatives is this choice made ? 
And how is it made ? The standard answer is that 
what one is concerned with is the choice between 
work (effort and its related painfulness) and 
"leisure" (non-work related activities). And such a 
choice is made according to some kind of optimisa-
tion process which could be the maximisation of her 
own well-being and self-fulfilment. 
3.  Choices, responsibility and child's schooling behaviour : 
    a re-examination 
In other words,  
),,*( itititit hrefI =                (1a) 
where e*it is the optimal amount of effort, resulting 
from the optimisation process.  
 
But for a choice to be an expression of freedom and 
thus as a matter of concern for responsibility, this re-
quires three conditions to be simultaneously fulfilled. 
First, the ability to make a conscious evaluation of the 
costs of the alternatives compared to their benefits in 
regard of one's own preferences. This is the informa-
tional aspect of choice as an expression of freedom. 
Second, the person has to have the ability to carry out 
a coherent procedure to make the choice ; this is the 
“rationality” aspect. Finally, and much more impor-
tantly, the costs and benefits of each alternative are to 
be such that a real choice can be made. This last con-
dition might have striking implications: i.e. the more 
Cahier de Recherche du GIRSEF - n° 17·•  March 2003 •  
Page  12 
important are the stakes from the choice process, the 
less "real" the choice might actually be. The usual 
example is the slave who can choose between work-
ing for his master or live in prison (or die): his choice 
could definitely not be considered as an expression 
of his freedom25. This example is the case when ex-
ternal power is exercised over the individual and con-
strains her choice set. But we can also have the case 
of "absolute" preferences, i.e. preferences about 
something that exclude any possible arbitrage be-
tween that "thing" that we more or less want and 
anything else26. It is this last possibility that seems to 
us relevant for the case at hand. 
 
Indeed, what sense does it make to talk about choice 
in the common sense of the word, for a child of 
scholarly age? Two alternatives should be contem-
plated: mandatory schooling and free enrolment in 
educational programs, i.e. higher education or, for 
some educational systems, higher secondary educa-
tion programs. Let us take the case of mandatory 
schooling.  
 
Children exhibit different degrees of implication, in-
volvement, interest in carrying out their compulsory 
schooling duties. To what extent could we consider a 
teenager who “does not like to study” as making a 
real choice, i.e. exercising her free will according to 
her own true preferences? A first answer would be to 
deny such exercise of free will altogether by arguing 
that the child's effort is itself determined by “non-
responsibility” factors like cognitive abilities, which in 
turn depend upon contextual factors, or previous 
school achievements. A child might have weak moti-
vations for study because he has or feels he has little 
talents, or real handicaps for studying. Or because 
she does not receive very much parent's or family 
support... This amounts to recognise that there are 
two distinct causality channels going from exogenous 
contextual factors to educational achievements, one 
direct, the other through their influences on prefer-
ences and thus on effort itself, as was already done 
when discussing Trannoy's suggestion of decompos-
ing the schooling process in two periods27.  
25 This justifies the importance of formal freedom as a prerequi-
site for the exercise of real freedom. Winner-take-all situations 
are also exemplary of this, see Arnsperger and DeVillé (2000). 
26 Inelastic demand curves are the consequences of "absolute 
preferences". As a necessary (but not sufficient) condition, this 
implies separability in the utility function between a specific ele-
ment in its argument and all the others. Separability implies that 
the cross partial derivatives are zero.  
27 This is of course the old, never ending, debate on "endogenous" 
versus "exogenous" preferences. For a discussion within the 
framework of "equal opportunity", see Fleurbaey (1998), in more 
general terms, Arnsperger and DeVillé (2001) 
28 Roemer (1998), pp.13-23  
29 The metric, proposed by Roemer, of the measure of the relative 
effort of a child is the centile he belongs to in the effort distribu-
tion of his type. 
30 "Addiction" would be the most common sense example of a 
separability characteristic in the utility function 
But this begs the question by actually assuming, if one 
stops there, that there is no such a thing as “free will”. 
The real, important question is what could be left of 
"pure free will" once all these influences are taken into 
account. What then could be "free will" if it exists?  
 
One could argue, as Roemer (1998) does, that for 
each population of children of given talents and handi-
caps there exists an observable distribution of school 
achievements and thus of effort performed by every 
child of this population28. Those distributions have no 
reasons to be identical. Their differences are related 
to "circumstances", the non-controllable factors dis-
cussed in the previous section. In other words, what 
children should be made responsible for is not their 
absolute effort level but their relative one29. The princi-
ple of compensation (the allocation rule) must then 
satisfy the condition that each child belonging to the 
same centile in any distribution of effort of whatever 
type must have the same school achievement.  
 
First, we, adults as well as children, are not responsi-
ble for our preferences as such. Second, we are how-
ever responsible for the voluntary consequences 
(choices) that we derive from our preferences. But, 
third, there are also "involuntary" consequences of our 
preferences in the sense that they are "choices" that 
are not expression of freedom30. For a child, choices 
about her implication or commitment to study has not 
),),,,(( 111 itititititit hrAhref −−−   (4a) 
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very much to do with the choice between labour and 
leisure, not alone the one with maximising the ex-
pected net income streams from additional year of 
schooling. Children do have "preferences" about 
studying but it is not between studying and some-
thing else: this what we called above “absolute pref-
erences”. The best words to describe those prefer-
ences are "motivation", "desire" or "eagerness"31. 
These are behavioural characteristics that respond to 
particular types of stimuli: relevance to his/her own 
life experience, game-like aspects, taste for abstrac-
tion, curiosity, etc. The intensity of this "preference" 
might vary substantially from one child to another, 
and so will her involvement and personal implication 
in the schooling process32. If we agree with this, then 
it is clear that the principle of natural reward has no 
places in here as a principle of justice since a child's 
effort cannot be considered as the expression of 
freedom of choice in the usual sense but much more 
as the expression of inner characteristics, of her per-
sonality. If the above reasoning is correct, pure effort     
happens to be like a "pure talent", non-correlated  
to any other contextual elements, once those have 
already been taken into account in the vector of ex-
tended resources {r, h}. 
tion as was the case in (4) and (5). In addition, the 
idea of decomposing the schooling process into two 
periods, one where exogenous factors are the exclu-
sive determinants of school achievements and the 
other where effort is the result of "free will" becomes 
no longer relevant.  
 
Different effort intensities will entail different school 
achievements and this throughout the entire compul-
sory schooling period. Having argued that it is not a 
matter of responsibility might suggest that we treat 
those differences exactly as differences in the other 
talents or handicaps, i.e. to use resources to equalise 
those differences. The equal opportunity approach 
should then be abandoned altogether. In the absence 
of any responsibility factor, only equality of outcomes 
would then remain as a meaningful principle of justice 
that should govern the allocation of resources in the 
educational system. But should we go along this line 
of thought? I do not think so. An argument can be 
made that those differences in effort, motivation or 
whatever reflect fundamental differences among hu-
man beings, who are fundamentally heterogeneous. 
Exactly in the same way as we argue for adults that 
there is no single common, universal conception of the 
"good life", we should accept that children do not have 
a single common view of what is a good, satisfactory 
and adequate level of schooling achievements. In this 
regard, justice requires to go beyond compensation of 
handicaps and should aim at equality of opportunities 
in a more extensive sense by providing adequate op-
portunities for everyone to follow the educational cur-
riculum most appropriate for her own specific motiva-
tions and expectations33. This requires a specific or-
ganisation of school programs combining a general 
curriculum common to all children especially at the 
start of the schooling process with increasingly, care-
fully designed diversification through the possible ac-
cess to various types of options.  
31 Dworkin talks about "ambition", Arneson and Cohen about 
"power of the will" but of course all of them makes it a matter of 
responsibility, which I don't. 
32 In more technical terms, one could argue that children have 
"utility functions" but that they are separable with respect to ef-
fort in education. The point is made in slightly different terms by 
Trannoy (1999), p.63. 
ite
),),,,,(( 111 ititititititit hrAhreef −−−    (4b) 
What are the implications of this for the equal oppor-
tunity approach in education? First, as we already 
hinted just before, the problem of the incompatibility 
between the two principles is no longer relevant. 
Only the principle of compensation should matter. 
The formulation (2), ensuring that the same effort will 
achieve the same outcome for every pair of individu-
als, remains entirely valid. But it is no longer required 
to have separability in the school achievement func-
33 This raises the issue of "valid" preferences: it is not because you 
want to become an engineer although you are not the best fit for 
that, that society should invest all the needed resources to give you 
the best chances for getting that degree.  
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The compensation principle is based upon the as-
sumption that substituability among determinants of 
schooling achievement other than effort itself is im-
portant. In other words, handicaps can be effectively 
compensated by additional resources devoted to the 
child by making her "extended resources" identical to 
those more favoured children. This is a key assump-
tion. More resources can indeed mean both quantity 
and quality improvements of the inputs of the educa-
tional process: better paid high quality teachers, 
more individualised aid for each child, increased 
availability of school infrastructures, better equip-
ment's are factors that, taken together, might be 
helpful in overcoming low cognitive abilities due to 
handicaps of various kinds.  
 
But they might not be sufficient to effectively improve 
school achievements if they are not accompanied by 
two other elements: an increasing effort level on the 
part of the children and an effective organisational 
functioning on the part of the school.  
 
Effort and other educational resources might actually 
be complements to each other. As a consequence, 
the school achievement function (1) has to be speci-
fied by making effort and other factors complements 
rather than substitutes. As an example and using the 
formulation of equation (4), the school achievement 
function could be specified as a quasi-Leontief func-
tion where α and β are unit input requirements. 
cerning the motivational aspects of the behaviour of 
the children, the parents and the teachers are not 
dealt with.  
 
What indeed are the incentive compatibility problems 
that an equal opportunity strategy might run into? 
 
First, children might be induced to decrease their ef-
fort level because of the additional resources that they 
might get. This would be particularly true for those 
who have the most handicaps and the least favour-
able environment. Since it is likely that on the average 
those children would tend to put lower effort, this as 
such should not concern us because the objective of 
the policy is not to maximize average effort per se but 
to give the chance to everyone to achieve as high as 
possible a level of school achievement. However, if 
effort, as suggested above, is a complement to re-
sources and talents, there is a reason to promote ef-
fort as much as possible. One way of doing this, which 
might be considered by the child as a real reward, is 
to give her in relation to her relative score perform-
ance the possibility of realizing, for example during 
vacation time, a “project” that has both intellectual and 
entertainment values.  
 
It has also been consistently established that family 
involvement might be extremely helpful in bringing up 
the motivations for study of the children. Parents moti-
vations for such an involvement clearly depends on 
the time constraints they are faced with, their “study-
culture” One possibility would be to make for low-
income families supplementary children benefits partly 
related to the more successful completion (better 
scores or improved scores) of school requirements 
relative to the average score of children of the same 
type. 
 
Teacher’s involvement in dealing with low ability chil-
dren is certainly more requiring and exhausting than 
with high ability ones. An equal opportunity strategy 
will justify payment of special compensation for teach-
ers who accept this challenge. But as it is often the 
4.      More on the child's schooling achievement function:  
complementarity and school organisation 



= −−−−−− βα
),(,),,,(min),),,,,(( 111111 itititititititititititititit
hrzAhreehrAhreef      (4c)
This simple formulation suggests that an equal op-
portunity strategy, to be effective, has to deal not 
only with the compensation of different handicaps, 
talents and other exogenous factors that determine 
learning capacities but also with the related 
motivational aspects, symbolised here by the 
variable. Pouring simply more resources into the 
system will not be enough to achieve a true equal 
opportunity situation if the incentives aspects con-
ite
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case, it is not so much a question of additional wage 
payments but of smaller teaching loads, more fre-
quent sabbatical leave for rethinking the pedagogy 
and the content of the courses and better support for 
developing a more personalised pedagogy for chil-
dren with handicaps. 
 
Finally, it should be apparent that the formulation of 
(4c) bypasses one crucial but often neglected aspect 
of a meaningful equal opportunity strategy. It exclu-
sively focuses the attention on child's behaviour and 
its determinants. But the variable rit, resources as an 
input in the child's schooling achievement function, is 
also produced by the school itself, primarily through 
the quality and quantity of the teacher's involvement 
in the pedagogical process as we have already dis-
cussed but also through its organisational features. 
The efficiency levels of schools vary significantly 
and, as many studies have shown, inefficient schools 
tend to be concentrated in areas where the propor-
tion of less favoured children is higher. On the other 
hand, best practices schools are most often the most 
equitable because their efficiency gains is translated 
mainly in improved school achievements for the chil-
dren doing worst than the average34. This suggests 
that schools with predominantly low ability children are 
faced with particularly severe organisational chal-
lenges and that they should receive specific help to 
overcome those difficulties. 
 
Does an equal opportunity strategy require, to be im-
plemented, “ability grouping” which by definition is det-
rimental to the “peer effects”, i.e. the positive external-
ities created by the interaction between low ability and 
high ability students in the same class room and in the 
same school? I am not so sure. One could imagine 
most of the tools used for such a strategy being de-
signed on an individual basis. However, we know that 
there are spontaneous forces that lead to segregation 
in terms of ability of scholarly populations among 
schools. An equal opportunity strategy will have to 
carefully balance the measures that should work 
against such a segregation with those that are de-
signed taking into account the existence of such a 
segregation but might reinforce it35. 
34 A recent study made by the French Ministry of Education 
(DPD, Direction de la Programmation et du Développement) 
shows that 25% of the secondary level public schools could be 
considered as being confronted with difficult, even severe situa-
tions and those establishments regroup four times as much low 
socio-economic background children as the average public 
school.  
5.     Concluding remarks 
The preceding discussion could be summarised in 
the following way. A "just" educational system should 
give the opportunity for every child, whatever her 
background, social origin, specific abilities, to 
achieve the highest possible general education level 
that will enable her to further study or compete for 
jobs appropriate to her own characteristics36.  
 
To achieve such an objective requires the implemen-
tation of policy measures (compensation principle) 
that will both compensate for differential in talents or 
handicaps and enhance the learning motivation of the 
children. In particular, every achievement by low abil-
ity children should lead to some concrete recogni-
sance of what has been achieved and to some new 
incentives to sustain that effort given the new possibili-
35 The ZEP (Zone d’Education Prioritaire, Priority Educational 
Zone) are among those measures. 
36 Which could be the degree corresponding to the compulsory 
school curriculum. One reminds, as said before, that in Belgium, 
where schooling is compulsory until the age of eighteen, it is esti-
mated that 40% of the children of a given age cohort do not com-
plete successfully the entire curriculum. 
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ties that it opens for the child. Finally, this policy to 
be effective should also promote the involvement of 
teachers and parents. 
 
For the implementation of a "principle of compensa-
tion" that has "build-in" incentives designed to sup-
port positive motivational change for less favoured 
children and to favour parents and teachers involve-
ment, one could consider the following policy propos-
als: 
 
•     An personalised educational project for 
every child, requiring specific school organi-
sation, team structuring and personal tutor-
ing for low ability children 
•     Common core program for all children but 
with increasing number of options, excluding 
formal ability grouping or tracking 
•     Centrally organised children evaluation that 
will allow teachers to better identify the per-
sonal characteristics of their pupils. How-
ever, in using such evaluation, one has to be 
careful about perverse signalling 
(stigmatisation) both of children and of 
schools that could lead to adverse selection 
problems and about the danger of inducing 
"perverse" teacher's behaviour, (team work 
and rewards are probably essential here) 
•     Teacher's supplementary benefits: subsidies 
to teachers for their involvement in difficult 
schools, and additional marginal subsidies 
(special training, lower teaching load, sabbati-
cal years for better than average results) re-
lated to their class performances (this requires 
outside evaluation, see above) 
•     For low income families, supplementary real 
income allowances for each successfully com-
pleted year of schooling, and ...  
•     "in kind" (based on an "extra-curriculum" activ-
ity project involving the family and discussed 
with the child's teachers...) and not "in pure 
money" terms, one being careful in both cases 
about not making the children instrumental-
ised by their parents who would be eager to 
maximise the income effect of their children 
success in school. 
•     Incentives for maximising peer effects: small 
group organisation for out of class work and 
rewards for classes narrowing the variance of 
the scores of a comprehensive evaluation by 
improving the lowest scores. 
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